First Committee 

 

 

 

 

India believes that the focus of this resolution should be limited to the region that it intends to address. 

 

India's position on the NPT is well known. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified the prevailing customary international law, provides that States are bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent. The call to those States remaining outside the NPT to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities is at variance with this principle and does not reflect current realities. India is not a Party to the NPT and is not bound by its outcome documents. This applies also to certain operative paragraphs contained in L2.

 

 

India has abstained on the resolution as a whole. With reference to PP6 of the resolution, India's position with regard to the NPT is well-known. There is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

 

 

India has voted in favour of this resolution consistent with its participation in the three meetings in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.  Our participation in these meetings was premised on the shared concern on the serious threat to the survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons and in the hope of gaining international support for increased restraints on use of such weapons.

 

L.47 is one of the longest standing resolutions in this Committee anchored firmly in the humanitarian tradition of nuclear disarmament. However, for reasons that are difficult to understand, some of the very states that are in the fore front of the humanitarian discourse and are the lead sponsors of L5 have in the past voted against the resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons this year contained in L47.  

 

We appeal to these states to reconsider their position and narrow the credibility gap between precept and practice that is difficult to ignore.  

 

 

India did not participate in the negotiations on a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which were concluded in New York on 7 July 2017. Our reasons for doing so are on record.

 

India, therefore, cannot be a party to the Treaty, and so shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it. 

 

India continues to attach priority to and remains committed to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. In this regard, India supports the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum working on the basis of consensus.

 

 

India agrees with several provisions of this resolution, in particular its acknowledgement that nuclear disarmament is a global public good of the highest order. We support the ICJ Advisory Opinion, that there exists a legal obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this regard, India has supported the NAM proposal for the commencement of negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the CD. 

 

The global elimination of nuclear weapons will require progressive steps of reduction of their military utility, reduction of their role in security policies and a universal commitment with a global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament.  Until that stage is accomplished by common agreement, reflected in specific international legal instruments, questions relating to the immorality of nuclear weapons have to be balanced by the sovereign responsibility of states to protect their people in a nuclearized global order put together on the pillars of nuclear deterrence.  India's nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, with a no-first use posture, seeks to strike this very balance. 

 

The illegality of nuclear weapons cannot just be a matter of opinio juris; it is necessary for the international community to negotiate and conclude specific legal instruments for that purpose. India has proposed a Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons to be negotiated in the CD and has supported a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention also to be negotiated in the CD.

 

 

India attaches the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. We share the main objective of this resolution which is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. 

 

We have been constrained, nevertheless, to abstain on L.18 because of certain references to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, on both of which India's position is well known.

 

However, our vote should not be seen as opposition to other provisions of the resolution, which we believe are consistent with NAM's as well as India's national positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We compliment Myanmar for retaining vital principled paragraphs in this resolution which are supported by a vast majority of countries.

 

 

We have voted against the draft resolution L.19 as well as its OP14 since India cannot accept the call to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In urging India to accede to NPT, 'promptly and without conditions,' the draft resolution negates the rules of customary international law, as enshrined in the Vienna Law of Treaties, which provides that a State's acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty is based on the principle of free consent. India's position on the NPT is well-known. There is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so, pending global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. 

 

 

We acknowledge that Japan, the lead sponsor, is the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack. We share the resolution's aspiration on nuclear disarmament, but in substantive terms, the text has again fallen short on this objective.

 

India has voted against OP 5 as we cannot accept the call to accede to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. India's position on the NPT is well-known. There is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.

 

India has abstained on OP20. As India supports the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons does not arise. India has also abstained on OP 28. As acknowledged by the recently adopted resolution of the IAEA General Conference on 'Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of agency safeguards', the concept of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement should be seen in its right context.

 

 

India respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear weapon states to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. This principle is consistent with the provisions of SSOD-I and the 1999 UNDC Guidelines.

 

India enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial relations with countries of the African continent and recently hosted a Summit meeting with all countries from Africa. India shares and supports African aspirations for enhancing the region's well-being and security. We respect the sovereign choice of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty and welcome the successful entry into force of the Treaty. As a nuclear weapon state, India conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect the status of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

 

 

India has been the only state possessing nuclear weapons to traditionally co-sponsor this resolution. We are disappointed that substantive changes have been made to the text of the resolution this year. In particular, we are disappointed that references to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention, based on the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention co-submitted by the lead sponsors themselves, have been dropped. Further, the substantive operational objective of this resolution as reflected in OP2 is no longer clear and therefore my delegation has been constrained to withdraw its co-sponsorship and abstain on the resolution.

 

 

 

India has voted in favour of L.26 given the importance it attaches to the CWC as a non-discriminatory treaty for the total elimination of a specific type of weapons of mass destruction. We regret that consensus has not been possible on this resolution this year as well. 

 

It has been our consistent position that the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anybody, under any circumstances, cannot be justified and the perpetrators of such abhorrent acts must be held accountable. My delegation is deeply concerned with reports of use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups. We believe that the international community must take urgent measures and decisive actions to prevent the possibility of any future use of chemical weapons.

 

 

 

India has voted in favour of L.53 on the No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space.

 

As a major space faring nation, India has vital developmental and security interests in space. The resolution states that the legal regime applicable to outer space needs to be consolidated and reinforced. India supports this objective and the strengthening of the international legal regime to protect and preserve access to space for all and to prevent without exceptions, the weaponisation of outer space. We support the substantive consideration of PAROS in the CD. While not a substitute for legally binding instruments, TCBMs can play a useful and complementary role to legally-binding instruments. We see the No First Placement of weapons in outer space as only an interim step and not a substitute for concluding substantive legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which should continue to be a priority for the international community. 

 

 

 

India has strong and effective national export controls with respect to export of defence items. India fully subscribes to the objective of the Arms Trade Treaty and our export control system is broadly aligned to the requirements of the ATT. As part of its commitment to international transparency measures, India submits an annual report under the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms for the same categories of conventional arms that are regulated under the ATT. 

 

India continues to keep under review the ATT from the perspective of our defence, security and foreign policy interests. We have therefore abstained on the draft resolution contained in L.27, pending this review. 

 

 

India supports the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and is committed to their eventual elimination. The availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines. 

 

India is a High Contracting Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which enshrines the approach of taking into account the legitimate defence requirements of States, especially those with long borders. India has fulfilled its obligations under AP-II including inter alia stopping the production of non-detectable mines as well as rendering all our anti-personnel mines detectable. India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. 

 

We have taken a number of measures to address humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel landmines in accordance with international humanitarian law. India remains committed to increased international cooperation and assistance for mine clearance and rehabilitation of mine-victims and is willing to contribute technical assistance and expertise to this end. 

 

India participated as an observer in the Third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction held in Maputo in 2014 as well as the Fifteenth Meeting of the States Parties in Santiago in 2016.

 

 

 

India has voted in favour of L.7 as it believes in the responsibility of States to fully comply with their obligations, as undertaken in various disarmament, non-proliferation and arms limitation agreements to which they are parties. Commitments of States, including 'other agreed obligations', also arise from obligations that States have undertaken voluntarily and in exercise of their sovereignty. 

 

We believe that States in encouraging compliance by other States with disarmament, non-proliferation and arms limitations agreements to which they are Parties, or in pursuing appropriate areas of cooperation to increase confidence in compliance, shall act in accordance with the compliance mechanisms and other provisions in the relevant agreements and in a manner consistent with the UN Charter and International Law. Similarly, they shall also resolve any issues related to compliance by a State of its obligations in respect of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms limitation agreements to which it is a Party, in accordance with the compliance mechanisms provided in the relevant agreements and in a manner consistent with the UN Charter and international law. We would also like to emphasize the importance of multilateralism in addressing issues that may arise in relation to non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments. 

 

 

 

India has voted against L.13 on 'Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels' and its OP2 which requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. 

 

The Conference, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a vocation of negotiating disarmament instruments of global application. In 1993, the UN Disarmament Commission had, by consensus, adopted guidelines and recommendations for regional disarmament. There is no need, therefore, for the Conference on Disarmament to engage itself in formulating principles on the same subject at a time when it has several other priority issues on its agenda. 

 

Further, we believe that the security concerns of States extend beyond narrowly defined regions. Consequently, the notion of preservation of a balance in defence capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context is both unrealistic and unacceptable to my delegation.

 

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